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Introduction
Trade secrets occupy an uncertain position in the First
Amendment pantheon. They do not share the advantage, unlike their
intellectual property cousins, copyright and patent, of having a
constitutional dimension and thus being arguably on somewhat equal
footing with the First Amendment.' Nor is there built into trade
secret jurisprudence a pre-balanced accommodation of the
fundamental rights of free expression that copyright and trademark
have in the fair use doctrine.'
Trade secrets directly conflict with First Amendment rights of
free speech and free press when trade secret holders seek to restrict
the publication of their trade secrets by others. Indeed, the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act provides for injunctions against the disclosure of
trade secrets as a primary remedy. However, First Amendment
principles, if applied fully, can make it extremely difficult to obtain
such relief, especially when the publisher owes no duty of
confidentiality to the owner of the secret.
At first glance, this conflict may seem irreconcilable, and there is
a resulting inclination by trade secret holders to argue that trade
secrets must thus be immune from First Amendment scrutiny. Yet
there is no historical basis for recognizing such an exemption and
efforts to carve one out from our most precious fundamental liberty
should not be taken lightly.
It is well established that the First Amendment protects the
publication of otherwise confidential information in a variety of
contexts. Trade secrets should be no different.
This conflict has become more pointed in this age of almost
instantaneous global communications, where the ability to
disseminate information far outpaces historical analogues. Yet, in
such situations, we must adjust our economic models, not our
constitutional ones.
1. Congress shall have power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see Dallas Cowboy
Cheerleaders, Inc. v Scoreboard Posters, 600 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979) (grounding its
holding that First Amendment principles did not apply in the "constitutional dimension"of
copyright law).
2. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work... is not infringement of copyright." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1996); see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.,
166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that First Amendment concerns in copyright cases
are allayed by the fair use doctrine).
I
Courts Have Long Protected the Right to Publish
Confidential Information under the First Amendment
and Resisted Carving Out Exceptions to
the First Amendment for Certain Categories of Content
The conflict between the First Amendment right to publish
information and the desire of some to keep information confidential
is not unique to the trade secret context. Courts throughout the
United States have had many occasions to determine whether a
publisher may be prevented from, or punished for disclosing
information that, like trade secrets, has either been acknowledged as
confidential either by statute or practice.
The United States Supreme Court has been unwavering in
protecting the right to publish lawfully obtained, truthful information,
despite significant state interests in, and statutory assurances of,
confidentiality. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in New York Times v.
United States,3 perhaps the most famous case on the issue, set the bar
for justifying an order restricting publication of confidential
information exceedingly high. In that case, the Court rejected the
federal government's attempt to bar the Washington Post and The
New York Times from publishing the contents of a classified
Department of Defense study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-
Making Process on Viet Nam Policy," commonly known as "The
Pentagon Papers."4 The papers had been improperly removed from
their secure location by Daniel Ellsberg, a consultant with the Rand
Corporation Despite the government's contention that national
security would be endangered should publication be allowed, the
Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, refused to enter the injunction.6
The Court held that the government's claims that disclosure of the
report posed a grave and immediate threat to national security did
not justify the injunction
3. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
4. Id. at 714.
5. Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who assisted Ellsberg in copying the report, were
later indicted on criminal charges for illegally removing and transmitting the report; the
charges were dismissed because of government misconduct. See Melville B. Nimmer,
National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26
Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1974).
6. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
7. Id. Two of the Justices in the majority accepted the government's assertion that
the disclosure of the material posed a substantial risk to national security. Id. at 730-31
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Nor did a threat to the institutional integrity of the judiciary
justify an exception to the First Amendment. In Landmark
Communications v. Virginia,8 the Court held that a publisher could
not be criminally sanctioned for divulging information about a
judicial review commission when the publisher was not a party to the
proceeding.9 The Court rejected the argument that even information
that by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential fell outside of the
freedom of the press."
And in Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court," the
United States Supreme Court refused to recognize an exception to
the First Amendment for identifying information regarding a juvenile
offender. The Court struck down a pretrial order that barred the
publication or other dissemination of the name or photograph of a
minor charged with murder. 3 Noting that the juvenile proceeding at
which the minor had appeared was open to the public, the Court
ruled that the press could not be restrained to report facts that were
available to any member of the public."'
Expanding upon its decisions, in Landmark Communications and
Oklahoma Publishing, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company,5
the United States Supreme Court stated the fundamental principle
that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a
matter of public' significance then state officials may not
constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order."'6 In Smith, the Court
rejected the contention that the. state's, interest in protecting the
privacy rights of minors justified a law that required newspapers to
seek permission from a court before publishing the names of any
minor charged as a juvenile offender. The privacy interest, which the
state asserted would further rehabilitation, was not of sufficient
magnitude to counterbalance the threatened First Amendment
rights."8
(Stewart, J., and White, J., concurring).
8. 435 U.S. 829, 840 (1978).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 311.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 310-11.
15. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
16. Id. at 103.
17. Id. at 104.
18. Id.
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Similarly, the Court rejected an exception to the First
Amendment for information identifying rape victims.19 The statutory
command that identities not be disclosed did not justify restrictions
on truthful publication by third parties. 2° Again, the Court found the
asserted state interest, although undeniably "highly significant,"
inadequate.2' These interests did not justify restrictions on publication
imposed by the statute.22
II
Trade Secrets Are Not Exempt From the First Amendment
A. Courts Have Consistently Rejected an Immunity from First
Amendment Scrutiny for Trade Secrets
Trade secrets are not exempt from the First Amendment. Courts
that have explicitly considered the issue have been uniform in
rejecting it, and in subjecting requests to restrict the dissemination of
trade secrets to First Amendment scrutiny.
In CBS, Inc. v. Davis,23 Circuit Justice Blackmun overturned a
preliminary injunction issued under the South Dakota Uniform Trade
Secrets Act against the broadcasting of a news report that would
reveal "confidential and proprietary practices and processes."'24 The
court below held that the First Amendment doctrine was
inapplicable.25 Justice Blackmun disagreed and, applying strict
scrutiny, struck down the injunction as an improper prior restraint,
despite the possibility that the information was obtained by criminal
26means.
The Second Circuit has explicitly rejected the contention that
"trade secrets are a special category of information to which the First
Amendment does not apply., 27 The court held that "[t]he fact that the
order at issue here involves trade secrets does not diminish the
19. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
20. See id. at 526.
21. Id. (The Court accepted the state's contention that preserving the anonymity of
rape victims helped protect the physical safety of the victims and encouraged victims to
report the crime.).
22. Id. at 537-39; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding
that damages could not be assessed against one who publishes the name of a rape victim
obtained from court files).
23. 510 U.S. 1315, 1316-18 (1994).
24. Id. at 1316.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Bridge C.AT. Scan Assoc. v. Technicare Corp., 710 F.2d 940, 943 (2d Cir. 1983).
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precedential effect" of cases applying the prior restraint doctrine.28
The Oregon Supreme Court similarly rejected "the existence of a
historical exception for the prior restraint protection of trade secrets
from publication by a third party publisher who receives information
lawfully., 29 "The speech that the statute restricts is, of course,
constitutionally protected expression.,
30
The California Court of Appeal has also recognized that a
purported trade secret "did not fall into any of the . . . established
exceptions [to the First Amendment]: it is not lewd, profane, obscene,
or libelous, nor did it involve any fighting words."31 Rather the
communication of the purported trade secret was "pure speech"
squarely within the ambit of the First Amendment.32
What does this mean? Restrictions on the publications of trade
secrets are subject to First Amendment scrutiny and considerable
procedural protections. The exact level of scrutiny warranted will
depend on the precise nature of the restriction sought.
III
Injunctions Against the Publication of Trade Secrets
Are Subject to Prior Restraint Analysis and Strict Scrutiny
A. Misdeeds in the First Amendment Context are Remedied by
Subsequent Proceedings for Damages; Prior Restraints Are
Strongly Disfavored
The First Amendment dictates that the proper relief is not an
injunction against publication but an action for post-publication
liability. "Subsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior
restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction for... misdeeds in
the First Amendment context., 3 "Both the history and language of
the First amendment support the view that the press must be left free
to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions,
or prior restraints."34
An order that prevents one from exercising his or her free speech
rights, rather than addressing the harm caused by an utterance after
28. Id. at 945-46.
29. Or. ex rel. Sports Mgt. News v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 1308-09 (Ore. 1996).
30. Id. at 1308.
31. DVD Copy Control Assn. v. Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th 648, 649, 01 CDOS 9406,
9409 (November 2, 2001).
32. Id. at 9410.
33. Davis, 510 U.S. at 1318.
34. New York Times. 403 U.S. at 717.
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the fact, is a "prior restraint." Prior restraints strike at the very heart
of the First Amendment: "In determining the extent of the [First
Amendment's] constitutional protection, it has generally, if not
universally, been considered that the chief purpose of the guaranty is
to prevent previous restraints on publication."35 "[P]rior restraints
upon speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights."36
Prior restraints carry with them a "heavy presumption" against
constitutional validity.37 Those seeking them thus bear a heavy burden
of showing that the remedy is justified.8 Indeed, for many courts,
simply identifying the restriction as a prior restraint is enough to
doom it. Other courts apply strict scrutiny to determine whether a
prior restraint is constitutionally permissible. In those cases, the party
seeking the injunction against the publication of a trade secret will
have to prove that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance a
state interest of the highest order. Or as Justice Blackmun, sitting as
Circuit Justice, wrote in CBS v. Davis, "[W]e have imposed this 'most
extraordinary remedy' only where the evil that would result from the
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be militated by less
intrusive measures." 4
B. Prior Restraint Doctrine Applies to Injunctions against
Publication of Trade Secrets
Courts around the country have applied the prior restraint
doctrine, and often, its strict scrutiny test in deciding whether to
enjoin the publication of trade secrets.
In Texas, for example, injunctions against the publication of
trade secrets are acknowledged as prior restraints on expression.'
Strict scrutiny, as articulated by the Texas courts, requires the party
seeking to protect the trade secret to prove that the injunction will
actually prevent an "imminent and irreparable harm" and that the
injunction is the least restrictive means available to prevent the
35. Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1930); Neb. Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
559 (1976)
36. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 726-27 (stating that prior restraints are permissible
only "at time of war," Id. at 730 (Brennan, J., concurring), or when a "direct, immediate
and irreparable damage to our nation or its people" is certain to result. Id. (Stewart, J.,
concurring).).
37. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971).
38. Id.; New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
39. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
40. 510 U.S. at 1318.
41. Markel v. J.L. & Assoc., 938 S.W.2d 74,79 (Tex. App. 4th Dist. 1996).
[23:537
2001] TRADE SECRETS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE INTERNET AGE 545
harm." Thus, the holder of the trade secret must demonstrate actual
injury." "Fear,". "apprehension," and the "possibility" of injury are
not sufficient. Thus, even the "well-settled rule" that injunctive relief
may be used when one breaches a confidential relationship to unfairly
use a trade secret must be applied subject to this strict scrutiny."
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized that a court order
that requires a publisher to obtain court approval before publishing
"alleged trade secrets" is "instantly recognizable as a classic 'prior
restraint.' 45 The court found that the statute that authorized the
order, a provision of the Oregon Uniform Trade Secrets Act, was
"invalid on its face" unless it "fit wholly within" an established
historical exception to the free expression protections.' The court
invalidated the order and the authorizing provision because there was
"no historical exception for the prior-restraint protection of trade
secrets from publication by a third party publisher who receives the
information lawfully."'
'
In California, a preliminary injunction barring publication of an
allegedly misappropriated trade secret was struck down as a prior
restraint. The court held that the trade secret holder's "statutory right
to protect its economically valuable trade secret is not an interest that
is "more fundamental" than the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech or even on equal footing with the national security interests
and other vital governmental interests that have previously been
found insufficient to justify a prior restraint.,
48
In Proctor & Gamble Company v. Bankers Trust Company9 the
Sixth Circuit applied the prior restraint doctrine in ruling that
multiple temporary restraining orders against the publication of
asserted trade secrets by Business Week magazine should never have
been issued. ° The parties had crafted a protective order that
42. Id.
43. Id. at 79-80.
44. Garth v. Staktek, 876 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex. App. 3rd Dist. 1994). The court
found that the trade secret owner had met its burden and proved it would suffer serious
irreparable injury without the injunction and that no other alternatives were available. Id.
at 550.
45. Or. ex rel Sports Mgt. News, 921 P.2d at 1308.
46. Id. at 1308-09.
47. Id. at 1309.
48. Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 663-65. The court's ruling expressly applied only to
preliminary injunctions. The court expressed no opinion as to whether permanent
injunctive relief following a full trial on the merits would be a prior restraint. Id.
49. 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).
50. Id. at 224-27.
designated certain information in court records as confidential trade
secrets." The court applied Justice Blackmun's strict scrutiny test
from CBS v. Davis52 and required a showing of a "grave threat to a
critical government interest or to a constitutional right."53 Applying
the same standard, the court also struck down a permanent injunction
that barred Business Week from publishing any material it had
obtained in violation of the protective order. 4
A federal court in Michigan applied the prior restraint doctrine
to invalidate an application of a provision of the Michigan Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. In Ford Motor Company, the defendant
published what were admittedly Ford's trade secrets on his Website 6
It was believed the defendant obtained the trade secrets from Ford
employees who had violated the confidentiality agreements that were
part of their employment contracts. 7 Ford sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the defendant from disclosing any of its
internal documents. 8 The district court held that, under these facts,
the Michigan Act's "authorization of an injunction violates the prior
restraint doctrine and the First Amendment."59 The court rejected the
argument that trade secrets should be judged against different
standards than the information that was the subject of the seminal
prior restraint cases: "while it may be true that Ford's trade secrets
here are more competitive in nature and more carefully protected
than those at issue in Proctor & Gamble, they are certainly not more
volatile than those at issue in the Pentagon Papers case. ' 6°
Some courts, however, have applied a less stringent test in two
51. Id. at 222.
52. Id. at 225-27.
53. Id. at 225.
54. Id.
55. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
56. Id. at 750.
57. Id. at 747-48.
58. Id. at 749.
59. Id. at 750.
60. Id. at 752-53; see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263
(E.D. Va. 1995) (applying the prior restraint doctrine to strike down an injunction
requested under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act); see generally Mark A. Lemley &
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48
Duke L.J. 147, 231 (1998) (noting that because of the applicability of the First
Amendment, "courts can't order newspapers not to publish materials, whether the
Pentagon Papers or the formula to Coca-Cola, even if the materials were leaked by
someone (such as Daniel Ellsberg) who had a duty to keep them private."); Bunner, 93
Cal. App. 4th at 663-65 (characterizing the mere publication of a trade secret as "pure
speech" and distinguishing the requested injunction from an order barring the use of trade
secrets).
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situations. The first is where the party seeking to publish the trade
secrets is bound by an employment contract that prohibits disclosure
or owes a similar duty of confidentiality to the owner of the trade
secrets. The second is when the party seeking to publish the trade
secrets has obtained them illegally.61
The lower level of scrutiny does not indicate that the First
Amendment is no longer applied. Rather, the use of intermediate
scrutiny is typical of First Amendment analysis in which the
restrictions on speech are incidental to valid restrictions on conduct.62
Where a duty of nondisclosure exists, restrictions on speech are
incidental to enforcement of the employment or nondisclosure
contract. Absent such a duty of confidentiality, publication of trade
secrets is pure speech; that is, speech that is not merely the expressive
element of conduct, the regulation of which is merely incidental to the
regulation of conduct.63
Thus, the publisher who directly violates a contractual or
professional obligation voluntarily entered into that restrains his or
her speech, for example, a confidentiality agreement or a fiduciary
duty not to publish certain information, will find less shelter under the
First Amendment when he or she publishes that information.'
61. Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) ("The protection
accorded the holder of a trade secret is against disclosure or unauthorized use of the trade
secret by those to whom the secret has been confided under the express or implied
restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. The Law also protects the holder of a trade secret
against disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner's volition, but by
'improper means,' Restatement of Torts §757(a), which may include theft, wiretapping, or
even aerial reconnaissance. A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against
discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental
disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture.").
62. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (setting forth the intermediate scrutiny
analysis under which restrictions on conduct that incidentally restrict expression are
analyzed). Intermediate scrutiny requires that the restriction further an important or
substantial governmental interest; that the interest be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and that the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms be no
greater than necessary to advance that interest. Id. at 377.
63. See Neb. Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 558, 570 (White, J., concurring); see e.g. Cherne
Indus. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 94 (Minn. 1979) (basing its holding on a
breach of contract and duty theory and noting that any incidental infringement of First
Amendment rights would be tolerable).
64. See Speedry Chems. & Prods. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir.
1962); Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 750 n. 6 (distinguishing the case before it from
the situation in which one "plans to reveal a trade secret in violation of an employment
contract or in breach of fiduciary duty" and noting that an injunction may issue in the
latter situation); see e.g. Snepp v.. U.S., 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (employment-related
confidentiality agreement); but see Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 225 (noting that the
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Similarly, restrictions on the use of, rather than the mere
publication of trade secrets are also subject to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny. In Federal Election Commission v.
International Funding Institute,6 5 the court applied O'Brien-style
intermediate scrutiny to determine whether to issue an injunction
against the use of proprietary information in unfair competition.' The
injunction barred the sale of and solicitation with the information, not
its mere publication.67 In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,' the
court, distinguishing between use and mere publication, invalidated a
permanent injunction because it had not been proven that the trade
secrets that were disclosed had actually been used to solicit the
former employer's customers.69
However, strict scrutiny should. still be applied in "third party"
situations: where the publisher owes no duty of confidentiality to the
71owner of the trade secret even though the publisher's source may.
Restrictions on third parties are not historically within the range of
relief available to holders of trade secrets. 7 As a California appellate
court has stated about its state's trade secrets principles, "[T]he
protection which is extended to trade secrets fundamentally rests
upon the theory that they are improperly acquired by a defendant,
usually through theft or a breach of confidence." 72
manner in which Business Week acquired the information could not be a basis for a prior
restraint); Garth, 876 S.W.2d at 549-50 (applying strict scrutiny, and finding that the
burden was carried, where trade secrets were obtained under nondisclosure agreement);
cf. In re Application to Adjudge the Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir.
1986), mod. on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding the
publication of surveillance logs compiled from material obtained in violation of a person's
Fourth Amendment rights and produced mistakenly to a newspaper under the Freedom of
Information Act was subject to strict scrutiny).
65. 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 1116.
67. Id. at 1113; Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 662 (distinguishing injunctions against
third party publishers from those sought against those bound by a contractual obligation).
68. 991 F.2d 511, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1993).
69. Id.; see also American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks, 213 Cal. App. 3d 622, 633-
36 (1989) (focusing on use of customer list by former employee to solicit customers as
distinguished from merely notifying them of her new position).
70. Or. ex rel. Sports Mgt. News, 921 P.2d at 1305, n.1 (distinguishing "third party
publishers," against whom an injunction could not issue, from the person "who holds the
trade secret and the one to whom the trade secret is disclosed in a confidential relationship
where secrecy prevails.").
71. See Story Equity § 952 ("[C]ourts of equity will restrain a party from making a
disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment.").
72. Vacco Indus. v. Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 50 (1992); see also Ferroline
Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 922-23 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 953 (1954) ("The only protection equity affords the possessor of a trade secret is
[23:537
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With respect to ex post liability for publishing confidential
information the publisher knows the source obtained illegally, the
Supreme Court recently held that the First Amendment barred
liability when the information disclosed pertained to a matter of
public interest." The Court affirmed the principle that the innocent
recipient of truthful information pertaining to the public interest does
not forfeit her First Amendment rights simply because she knows the
information was obtained illegally.74 Several justices concurring with
the plurality opinion cautioned however that their holding may not
extend to private information such as trade secrets.75 That a trade
secret could be a matter of public interest was apparently not
contemplated.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
explicitly. In the Pentagon Papers case,7 6 it was well known that
Ellsberg had improperly removed the documents.77 Yet, the Court
was largely silent as to whether the fact that the third party
publishers, The New York Times and the Washington Post, knew their
source's wrongdoing changed the constitutional calculus. Although
each Justice wrote his own opinion, only Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
thought it important to note that the Times's possession of the
Pentagon Papers was "unauthorized."" With respect to ex post
liability for publishing confidential information the publisher knows
the source obtained illegally, the Supreme Court considers the
question unresolved. As it stated in a footnote in Florida Star:
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in
cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a
newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not
only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as
well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved in
New York Times and reserved in Landmark
Communications. We have no occasion to address it here.79
The Court may address the issue this term when it rules on
to prevent its use by those who obtain the secret information in breach of contract or of a
fiduciary relationship, and by parties who knowingly participate in such breach.").
73. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (May 21, 2001).
74. Id. at 530.
75. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
76. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
77. Id. at 714.
78. Id. at 759.
79. 491 U.S. at 535 n. 8.
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Bartnicki v. Vopper. ° In that case the Third Circuit considered the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act,8 which, in part, prohibits
the disclosure of communications by one who knows they have been
illegally intercepted. The court ruled that the law could not be applied
to allow a cause of action against a reporter who knew of the illegal
interception but did not participate in or encourage it.82 The court
rejected the suggestion that the publication by one of information
improperly obtained by another may be justified on the principle that
such a restriction eliminates the demand for the fruits of the thief's
labor.83 This conclusion put the Third Circuit in some conflict with the
D.C. Circuit which had previously found a similar subsection of the
law to be constitutional. ' In Boehner, a single judge writing for the
divided court held that there was no basis for distinguishing between
the First Amendment rights of one who illegally obtains confidential
information and one who legally obtains information from one who
the recipient knew obtained it illegally.85
Unless disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive for
illegal interception; and unless disclosure is prohibited, the
damage caused an illegal interception will be compounded.
It is not enough to prohibit disclosure only by those who
conduct the unlawful eavesdropping.... It was therefore
essential for Congress to impose upon third parties, that is
upon those not responsible for the interception, a duty of
nondisclosure.86
Nevertheless, in both cases, the courts subjected the laws to First
Amendment scrutiny. Even illegally intercepted information was not
exempt from the First Amendment. The Freedom of Information Act
was protected by the First Amendment.
Likewise, the level of scrutiny should not be diminished when the
third party obtains the information innocently but then later learns
that its source obtained it improperly.' Although, the high level of
80. 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. petition filed (April 19, 2000), argued (Dec. 5,
2000).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c).
82. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 128.
83. Id. at 113, 123.
84. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 470.
86. Id.
87. In Bridge C.A.T. Scan Assoc., 710 F.2d 940 (2nd Cir. 1983), the court noted that
there were some circumstances where an injunction against the disclosure of trade secrets
may issue, namely, "where a party has obtained them by breaching its confidential
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scrutiny may result in some degree of trade secret "laundering" -
that is, feeding stolen trade secrets to innocent publishers so that the
secret is destroyed - that is certainly preferable, unless the strict
scrutiny analysis counsels otherwise, to restricting the fundamental
constitutional rights of innocent people. At a minimum, the owner of
the trade secret faces a heavy burden to prove with certainty that the
trade secrets were actually obtained illegally. Mere allegations of
impropriety cannot support a restriction on First Amendment rights.
C. Preliminary Injunctions Against First Amendment Rights Are
Exceedingly Rare
The scenario in which First Amendment law and trade secret law
most directly clash is with respect to preliminary injunctions. Because
trade secrets lose their protection once they become commonly
known, preliminary injunctions are commonly sought to preserve the
information as a secret until the case can be finally adjudicated.
However, First Amendment law strongly disfavors injunctive relief
without the benefit of a full and complete trial on the merits."
Moreover, although permitted in other contexts, temporary
injunctions that may be deemed necessary to allow the court time to
sort out difficult legal or factual questions are not available to
prohibit the exercise of First Amendment rights. As Justice Brennan
stated, bemoaning the fact that a restraining order was in effect for a
week in the Pentagon Papers case, the First Amendment injury
occasioned by an injunction that sought to preserve the
confidentiality of documents was not diminished "because that
restraint was justified as necessary to afford the courts an opportunity
to examine the claim more thoroughly."89 Nor does a preliminary
injunction that prohibits publication "preserve the status quo" as it
may in other contexts. In the First Amendment context, the status
quo is for a publisher to publish, not be prevented from doing so.90 As
relationship with the owner, or by procuring another to breach a confidential relationship
with the owner." Id. at 946 (citations omitted). However the court was not as clear on the
propriety of an injunction "where a party has obtained them innocently but has thereafter
learned of their misappropriation." Id. (citing New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713).
88. See Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 666 (confining its holding to preliminary
injunctions).
89. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[W]hatever
value there may be in the preservation of novel questions for appellate review may not
support any restraints in the future."); see also Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 226-27
(rejecting the contention that First Amendment rights could be temporarily restrained in
order to give the court time to study the legal questions); In re Providence Journal, 820
F.2d at 1351.
90. In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1351.
a result, preliminary injunctions against First Amendment rights are
exceedingly rare.9
The First Amendment requires enhanced procedural safeguards
and the heaviest burden possible on a party seeking a preliminary
injunction against publication. The Supreme Court "has insisted upon
careful procedural provisions, designed to assure the fullest
presentation and consideration, of the matter which the circumstances
permit."92 The Sixth Circuit, in reviewing the publication of asserted
trade secrets acknowledged that "the prerequisites for emergency,
temporary relief in the First Amendment realm differ dramatically,
and appropriately, from the realm of everyday resolution of civil
disputes governed by the Federal Rules."93
The reason for these "bulwarks" is clear. A preliminary
injunction comes without the benefit 'of a full consideration of the
facts. The parties have had little opportunity to develop evidence.
Because whatever evidence submitted is typically done so by way of
declaration, on information and belief, the parties are denied the
opportunity to cross-examine, and the court is denied the opportunity
to assess credibility. This is an extremely careless mechanism to use
when First Amendment rights are at peril.94
Generally, in the non-speech context, a preliminary injunction
will be issued if the movant has shown (1) it has a likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) that it will be irreparably harmed if
immediate relief is not granted because no adequate remedy at law
exists; (3) that such harm outweighs injury suffered by the restrained
patty if the injunction is issued in error; and (4) that the granting of
the injunction will serve the public interest. 95 Courts will typically
91. In the trade secret context, see Ordo Templii Orientis v. City of Berkeley, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15018 at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. 1991), in which the court noted that a
"preliminary injunction may be considered proper in connection with trade secrets and
misappropriated information" only in "very limited circumstances."
92. Carroll v. President & Comm. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1968)
(noting also 'the balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area
of First Amendment adjudication"); see also Freedman v. Md., 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)
(requiring "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system"); Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (stating "the larger principle
that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with bulwarks").
93. Proctor & Gamble Co, 78 F.3d at 227.
94. See In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1351 (noting that a prior restraint
"issued prior to a full and fair hearing with all the attendant procedural protections" faces
an even heavier presumption of invalidity than a prior restraint issued after such a
hearing).
95. Rock and Roll Hall of Fame v. Gentile Productions, 134 F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir.
1998); Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, 731 F.2d 523, 526 (8th Cir. 1984); O'Connor v.
Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1982).
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analyze the first two factors on a sliding scale: if the movant is highly
likely to succeed on the merits, the movant's harm need not be so
significant or irreparable; if the harm suffered is truly irreparable and
no other remedies are available, the court will grant the injunction
even if the likelihood of success is not so strong.96 The First
Amendment impacts each of these factors.
1. The movant is unlikely to demonstrate a strong likelihood of
success on the merits when the ultimate relief it seeks is a prior
restraint
When the ultimate relief sought is a prior restraint on
publication, the movant will be hard-pressed at a preliminary stage to
demonstrate that such extraordinary relief is warranted. As discussed,
an injunction against publication is a prior restraint against First
Amendment rights - that is, "one of the most extraordinary
remedies known to our jurisprudence."'
2. The First Amendment requires that the movant suffer serious,
irreparable harm
Under the enhanced scrutiny the First Amendment requires, the
trade secret owner must prove that it will suffer serious, irreparable
injury, even if the likelihood of success is otherwise high. The sliding
scale described above is not employed. The requirement that there be
no adequate remedy at law, such as damages, is an absolute
requirement when a prior restraint is sought.
Any claim that irreparable harm should be presumed because
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act authorizes an injunction is also
without merit. The presumption of irreparable harm that in other
contexts accompanies a legislative authorization of an injunction is
not available when First Amendment rights are at issue.9 Were a
legislative finding so capable of limiting constitutional scrutiny, "the
scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to
legislative definition and the function of the First Amendment as a
check of legislative power would be nullified."'
96. Metro Publications, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir.
1993).
97. Neb. Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 562.
98. Pennekamp v. Fla., 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 378-
79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
99. Landmark Comm., 435 U.S. 843-44.
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3. The trade secret owner must assert more than a mere economic
interest to counterbalance the publisher's constitutional rights
When an injunction is sought against pure speech, the trial court
must find that publication "threatens an interest more fundamental
than the First Amendment itself" and forgo the simple balancing
analysis that is used in a standard request for an injunction.'"
A mere economic or proprietary interest does not adequately
counterbalance a First Amendment injury. Thus, any suggestion that
a party's rights in a trade secret per se balance out First Amendment
rights must be rejected.' ° The Sixth Circuit implicitly rejected such an
argument in Proctor & Gamble Company. °2 There, the Sixth, Circuit
examined whether an injunction could issue against the publication of
asserted trade secrets that had been sealed during litigation but
obtained by Business Week. The court found that the companies'
"interest in protecting ... their commercial self-interest simply does
not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint."10 3 Furthermore,
the temporary nature of a preliminary injunction does not make the
harm suffered by the enjoined party less "irreparable."'0°
Indeed, the only cases in which the United States Supreme Court
100. Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227; see also City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31
Cal. 3d 527, 536 (1982) (holding that First Amendment rights are awarded substantial
weight in counterbalancing tort policies), cert. vacated, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), affd on
remand, 33 Cal. 3d 727 (1983); Smith v. Silvey, 149 Cal. App. 3d 400, 407 (1983) (requiring
that the interest sought to be protected by the injunction have "equal dignity and
protection with First Amendment liberties"); In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1351
(requiring that the party requesting the preliminary injunction against publication assert a
"near sacred right").
101. Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th 662.
102. 78 F.3d at 225.
103. Id; see Religious Tech. Ctr., 897 F. Supp. at 262-63 (holding that the threat of
future copyright infringement or trade secret misappropriation is "woefully insufficient" to
justify a prior restraint); see also Paradise Hills v. Procel, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1528, 1538, 1542
(1991) (holding that the plaintiff's economic interest was outweighed by the denial of the
defendant's free speech rights); Allred v. Shawley, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1489, 1496 (1991)
(noting that in comparing the rights of shopping center owners with those of speakers,
"[t]he balance is tipped in favor of the right to voice ideas as opposed to the property
rights or mere naked title of the owners" ).
104. Neb. Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 559 (holding that the temporary nature of the
restraint did not reduce the severity of the constitutional injury); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); see also New York Times, 403 U.S. at 715
(Black, J., concurring) (stating that "every moment's continuance of the injunctions
against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant , indefensible, and continuing violation of
the First Amendment").
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has seemed willing to even entertain the possibility of overriding First
Amendment interests are those in which the interests of co-equal
constitutional protections or the fate of the Republic itself were
asserted.'
4. The public interest favors the enforcement of individual liberties
In almost all situations, the public will be served by affirming the
publisher's First Amendment rights, not restricting them. As the
California Supreme Court has stated:
There can be no doubt that vindication of the rights at stake
in this litigation effectuate fundamental constitutional
principles. 'Freedom of Speech is a right which is at the
fountainhead of all of our liberties .... ' While these rights
are by nature individual rights, their enforcement benefits
society as a whole. Indeed, only by protecting each
individual's free speech and free petition rights will society's
general interest in these rights be secured.1
IV
The Power of The Internet to Rapidly DisseminateInformation
Worldwide Does Not Require That First Amendment
Principles Be Modified
A. The Internet Facilitates Rapid International Dissemination of
Information Which Challenges Many of the Assumptions
Underlying the First Amendment
The Internet, and the communications revolution that has
resulted from it, is seen as an unprecedented threat by the holders of
trade secrets and other confidential information. Trade secrets are
protected only to the extent they are not known to the general public.
However, when a trade secret is posted on a public site on the
Internet, it is almost instantly available to Internet users around the
world. The concerns about misappropriation, and the perceived need
to restrict the publication of trade secrets, are thus multiplied.
The following characteristics of the Internet and communications
on the World Wide Web require some consideration in determining
105. Cf. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526 (right to privacy); Landmark Comm., 435 U.S. at
841 (integrity of the judiciary); Neb. Press Assoc., 427 U.S. at 551 (Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial); New York Times, 403 U.S. at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("power to wage
war successfully").
106. Press v. Lucky Stores, 34 Cal. 3d 311, 319 (1983).
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whether traditional First Amendment protection should extend in full
force to the dissemination of trade secrets in this still new medium.
1. The Internet allows for instantaneous international distribution;
thus there is a greater need for preliminary injunctions short of
complete proof
The lag time that existed in the conventional media, where there
was a delay between disclosure of the secret and its being widely
circulated to such an extent that it was considered to be known to the
public, has been eliminated. Thus, now one who acquires a trade
secret can make it available to all Internet users almost instantly. The
trade secret can be "destroyed" in a very short period of time.
Applying the Daily Mail test, whereby the right to publish
information that is generally available to the public is protected even
against ex post remedies, will doom trade secrets. The need for
preliminary injunctions and emergency restraining orders is more
compelling. Strict scrutiny is simply too demanding.
However, the First Amendment has never been interpreted to
vary its protections in proportion to the efficiency with which the
message at issue is circulated. Rather, courts have used the First
Amendment to preserve a communicator's ability to reach his or her
intended audience in an effective manner. Indeed, it was the
Internet's ability to facilitate rapid, global communications that so
impressed the Supreme Court when it declared that communications
on the Internet were due unqualified First Amendment protection.
As stated in Reno v. ACLU:
From the publisher's point of view, it constitutes a vast
platform from which to address and hear from a world-wide
audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and
buyers.... [I] Through the use of chat rooms, any person
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through
the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the
same individual can become a pamphleteer.... We agree ...
that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium."°7
107. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853, 870 (1997); see also Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d at 752-53 ("And while the reach and power of the Internet raises serious legal
implications, nothing in our jurisprudence suggests that the First Amendment is
circumscribed by the size of the publisher or his audience.").
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The fact that Internet communications are so rapid and wide-
ranging may help a trade secret owner establish "irreparable harm,"
but there is nothing about the Internet that compels a weakening of
the First Amendment's bulwarks.
2. Everyone can be a publisher with an international audience; thus
the potential exists for large scale dissemination of information
without "legitimate" press standards and editorial decision-
making
Much of the law setting forth the right to publish arose in the
context. of the established press. The Internet has exponentially
expanded the ranks of those who are capable of disseminating
information to a large, international audience. Yet, some complain,
these new publishers do not adhere to the same journalistic standards
and thus should not have the benefit of the "legitimate" press'
constitutional protections.
This argument fails on its own logic. In terms of communicative
power, the Internet makes individuals function more like the
"press." ' Moreover, the press' constitutional protections have never
been conditioned on the exercise of professional standards. These
standards may influence the degree of credibility the reader places on
the writing, but they do not affect the applicability of the First
Amendment. The constitution protects the activity, not the
institution.
Indeed, the freedom of the press has its origins in the protection
of pamphleteers and independent printers, not major metropolitan
newspapers.1°9 As a federal court considering a individual Website
operator's publication of trade secrets observed: "While it may be
108. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 853 ("Any person connected to the Internet can
"publish" information.").
109. See Mclnyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that when the Framers of the Constitution used the phrase "the press,
they did not envision the large, corporate newspaper and'television establishments of our
modern world" but instead ."refer[red] to the many independent printers who circulated
small newspapers or published writers' pamphlets for a fee."); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 452 (1938) ("The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort if
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion."). The "freedom of the
press" guaranteed by the First Amendment should not be read to limit its coverage to the
"legitimate" press. Org. for A Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 419 ("Petitioners plainly intended
to influence respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally different
than the function of a newspaper."); Bridges v. Cal., 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (applying free
press protections to both a newspaper and an individual); see also Nizam-Aldine v. City of
Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th 364, 374-75 (1994) (stating the well established law in California
that there is no distinction in the rights afforded established media publishers and the
general public.).
true that publication on the Internet is subject to fewer editorial
restraints than The New York Times, Business Week, or The
Washington Post, the material here is not more inflammatory than the
anti-Semitic tabloid at issue in Near." 110
3. Because the range of "innocent" third parties who may come upon
trade secrets is exponentially larger, some accommodation for
trade secret owners must be made
Just as the Internet has vastly multiplied the number of global
publishers, it has multiplied the publisher's audience to a similar
degree. And the likelihood that one discovering information on the
Internet will know the publisher or have any information about the
publisher's sources has diminished to almost nothing. As a result, the
universe of potential "innocent" recipients of trade secrets, that is
persons who do not know that the trade secrets were stolen, has
increased exponentially. Certainly at least, a lower level of scrutiny
should apply to even the innocent third party.
But such a policy would expose every Internet user to liability for
disseminating information she discovered on the Internet, regardless
of the medium in which she disseminates it. To diminish First
Amendment protections in this way would have a severe chilling
effect with consequences reaching far beyond marginal protections
for trade secret owners.
4. Linking on the World Wide Web allows for the widespread
dissemination of trade secrets, even if the secrets are not actually
republished
Another issue receiving judicial attention is the extent to which
liability should extend to those who do not publish trade secrets but
who provide links to Websites where such information is available.
One court has held that it should. In Universal City Studios,111 the
court considered a request for a permanent injunction against those
who, among other conduct, linked to sites that contained certain
programs allowing for the circumvention of copyrights.'12 Provision of
circumvention technology is barred by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act."3 The court held that a publisher could be enjoined or
held liable for providing the link if it were proven that "those
responsible for the link (a) know at the relevant time that the
110. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d at 752-53.
111. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
112. Id at 303-04.
113. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
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offending material is on the linked-to site, (b) know that it is
circumvention technology that may not lawfully be offered, and (c)
create or maintain the link for the purpose of disseminating the
technology."' This decision is currently being reviewed by the
Second Circuit.
But liability should not extend that far. The court's linking test
prohibits the publication of information that is permitted in other
media-print publishers, which commonly include Web addresses in
their articles and bibliographies in books. Again, the difference is that
the Internet allows for more efficient transmittal of information.
Indeed, some links are "hot" or "hyper" and need only be clicked on
to bring up the offending material. Yet, as discussed above, speed and
efficiency are no reason to diminish First Amendment protections.
5. The First Amendment rule against injunctions because of
jurisdictional limits is too restrictive because of the international
nature of the Internet
In the First Amendment context, a preliminary injunction will
not be issued unless the absence of the injunction will "surely result in
direct, immediate, or irreparable damage.'.1.5 Thus, requests for
remedies that are not completely effective will be rejected even if
they might provide some marginal relief to the aggrieved party.
In the trade secret context, where injunctions are sought to
preserve the "secret" status of the information, an injunction that
does not completely remove the secret from the public domain will be
ineffective. The Internet augments this problem because publication
may be global while the jurisdiction of the courts is necessarily
limited; an order from a United States court will not stop foreign
publishers from exposing the secret to the general public.
In the pre-Internet world, the United States Supreme Court
strongly cautioned against prior restraints that are of questionable
efficacy because of the problem of enforcing them in other
jurisdictions. The Court has stated that a court cannot "ignore the
reality of the problems of managing and enforcing pretrial restraining
orders."'6 Indeed a court "must assess" the "probable efficacy of
prior restraint on publication" to operate as a "workable method" of
protecting the rights that the injunction is designed to address."7
114. Universal, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
115. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730.
116. Neb. Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 565.
117. Id.
Specifically relevant to this assessment is a court's inability to enjoin
publication in other jurisdictions: the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court is limited by concepts of sovereignty. The need for in
personam jurisdiction also presents an obstacle to a restraining order
that applies to publication at large as distinguished from restraining
publication within a given jurisdiction. 118
As with the issues discussed above, applying less stringent
constitutional standards will not solve the problem; the information
will still be available to the general public. All the trade secret holder
will have done is punish the publisher. Other remedies besides a prior
restraint are available to accomplish that.
6. Internet publication is persistent so publishers should remove
trade secrets once they learn of their confidential status
Internet publication, at least at this still early stage in the
development of the medium, tends to age more slowly than its print
counterpart. Information that is posted on Websites may be as
available to Internet users ten years from now as it is today. The date
the site was created is not always evident; indeed, the Web is replete
with sites that appear to be current but have not been updated for
several years. The question of what standard should be applied to the
innocent publisher who later learns that its source obtained the trade
secrets improperly thus becomes more pointed.
The issue is difficult, but we should be cautious in creating a legal
standard in response to the conventions of the medium. As discussed
above, the circumstances of the publication may be considered in the
strict scrutiny analysis, but the strong preference remains for post-
publication remedies rather than for prohibitions on expression.
B. Changing the Applicable First Amendment Standard Will Not
Change the Reality
The Internet has made the international distribution of trade
secrets more efficient, indeed in some ways, potentially
instantaneous. The threat to trade secret holders that their secrets can
be easily laundered is real. "9 But, softening the First Amendment will
118. Id. at 565-66.
119. In Bartnicki, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that such concerns
for laundering were better addressed by augmenting the punishments for the illegal act
rather than punishing the innocent actor. 532 U.S. at 529-30. The Court expressly rejected
the proposition that a restriction on speech could be justified on the grounds that such a
restriction eliminates the demand for the fruits of the thief's labor. "The normal method of
deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an -appropriate punishment on the person who
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not change the reality that the secret information is available to the
general public. Also, it will not make those who discover this
information that was readily available to any Internet user any less
"innocent."
The First Amendment has faced similar challenges whenever a
new communications medium is introduced: radio, broadcast
television, cable television, etc. The Internet is not unique in being
feared because of its communicative power.
However, the appropriate response to the challenges raised by
the Internet is to change our economic models, not our constitutional
ones. Adjusting the application of First Amendment standards might
help address some of the concerns, but it will not eliminate them. The
economic models will be forced to change anyway.
V
Conclusion
Trade secrets are not exempt from the First Amendment. As a
result, a party seeking to enjoin the publication of trade secrets,
especially by one who owes no duty of confidentiality to the owner of
the trade secret, faces a considerable challenge.
The communicative power of the Internet does not require
reconsidering the level of First Amendment protection afforded to
publishers. Indeed, we should resist reactionary changes to our
fundamental constitutional principles, and look first to adjusting trade
practices to reflect the reality of communications in the Internet Age.
engages in it. If the sanctions that presently attach ... do not provide sufficient deterrence,
perhaps those sanctions should be made more severe. But it would be quite remarkable to
hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to
deter conduct by a non-law abiding third party." Id. The Court further noted the lack of
any "empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosure
reduces the number of illegal interceptions." Id. at 530-31.
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